The discipline of project management (PM) adheres to the dominant model of the project life cycle or phased stage-gate approach to executing projects. This implies a clear definition of mission and system are given at the outset (to reduce uncertainty), and subsequent execution in phases with decision gates. It contrasts with approach applied in the seminal projects that are credited with establishing the foundation of the discipline in the 1940s and 50s.
Introduction
The Project Management Institute, the most influential association governing the professional discipline, defines project management (PM) as the application of knowledge, skills, tools, and techniques to project activities in order to meet the "triple constraints" of scope, time and cost.
A key concept in managing projects is the "project life cycle" -phases that projects go through, each having an outcome and end-review that triggers a decision about whether to start the next one. Phase outcomes may include the charter, scope statement, plan, baseline, milestone progress, acceptance, and handover. In brief, project management takes the project mission and goals as given and has adopted a phased "stage-gate" approach as the professional standard.
ii The Manhattan Project "certainly displayed the principles of organization, planning and direction that typify the modern management of projects."
iii It "exhibited the principles of organization, planning, and direction that influenced the development of standard practices for managing projects." iv This characterization of the roots of PM represents a certain irony: the Manhattan Project did not even remotely correspond to the "standard practice" associated with PM today. Indeed, the Manhattan and the first ballistic missile projects fundamentally violated the phased project life cycle approach. Both applied a combination of trial-and-error and parallel trials in order to "push the envelope", that is, to achieve outcomes considered impossible at the outset.
However, the project management discipline has now so deeply committed itself to a control-oriented phased approach that the thought of using trial-and-error puts professional managers ill at ease. In our seminars, experienced project managers react with distaste to the violation of sound principles of phased control when they are told the real story of the Manhattan Project (or other ambitious and uncertain projects). The discipline seems to have lost its roots of enabling "push the envelope" initiatives, de facto focusing on controllable run-ofthe-mill projects instead.
How could this happen? And does it matter? In this paper we conduct an extensive review of the literature, including our own research over ten years, to explain how the discipline "lost its roots". We argue that this matters a great deal: it has prevented the project management discipline from taking center stage in the increasingly important efforts of organizations to carry out strategic change and innovation. By excavating the roots of the management of innovative projects, we attempt to connect PM to a growing body of work that emphasizes the need for flexible search in innovation and organizational change. 
The "Roots": Project Management in the 1950s
We propose that PM has an opportunity regain the central place it should never have lost in the management of strategic initiatives, innovation and change, but that this will require adding more flexible methods to the available toolkit.
The Manhattan Project
Even a brief review of the history of the Manhattan Project reveals the extent to which it violated the phased stage-gate approach. vi Scientists had been aware since the 1930s that a nuclear fission chain reaction might offer a much greater source of energy than chemical
reactions. "A chain reaction had not been obtained but its possibility -at least in principlewas clear, and several paths that might lead to it had been identified. But the available knowledge was theoretical and very incomplete. (…) The theory was full of unverified assumptions, and calculations were hard to make. Predictions made in 1940 by
different physicists of equally high ability were often at variance.
The subject was in all too many respects an art, rather than a science." vii
Scientists and engineers faced two major problems: the production of fissionable materials and the design of the bomb itself. Two fissionable materials could be identified: enriched uranium and the recently (in 1941) discovered plutonium.
For bomb design, multiple ways could be imagined of (from Serber, 1992) bringing nuclear fission material together to obtain a critical mass for a self-sustained chain reaction (i.e., an explosion). For example, scientists drew five different designs in a seminar organized by Robert Oppenheimer in July 1942, as shown in Figure 1 : (from top to bottom) gun-shot, half-sphere, implosion, modified gun-shot, and diffusion designs.
But which one would work and with which material (uranium or plutonium) was entirely unclear, as project manager General Leslie Groves and his steering committee decided to explore and implement different solutions in parallel, both for the production of fissionable materials and for the design of the bomb itself.
These principles were put into action as follows (see Figure 2 ): 4 -Uranium separation, plutonium production and bomb design proceed concurrently -For Uranium separation, two different methods were used in parallel. A third method, thermal diffusion, was added late in the project, in September 1944 -The Los Alamos laboratory explored several different bomb designs at the same time.
The "gun" design (using uranium) was the "lead" first, but in july 1944 they had to switch to the "implosion" design for plutonium -Moreover, they performed the phases of research (to establish working principles) and development of the production plants (to obtain working materials) simultaneously. Ten years later, Bernard Schriever called this approach "concurrency": the simultaneous (or overlapped) performance of logically sequential tasks. Groves had already used it in previous projects, but this was the first time it was extended to fundamental research.
In the face of high technical and scientific uncertainties, the willingness to modify and add solutions mid-course enabled the project to respond to emerging, unforeseen events. In addition, the parallel pursuit of several alternatives increased the likelihood of success as well as the speed of obtaining a workable solution in the face of a rival effort by Nazi Germany. T1  T2  T3  T4  T1  T2  T3  T4  T1  T2  T3 T1  T2  T3  T4  T1  T2  T3  T4  T1  T2  T3 Unforeseen events did arise, as illustrated by the crisis in the spring of 1944. By this date, none of the methods for producing enriched uranium had achieved sufficient accretion rates, and the "gun" design for the bomb was unsuitable for plutonium, which exhibited a much higher "spontaneous fission" rate than anticipated. The project had maneuvered itself into a dead end, with a fissionable material (plutonium) without a bomb design, and a bomb design (the "gun") without a workable fissionable material (uranium 235). The flexible but redundant managerial project strategy now offered the means to overcome the crisis:
1944 1945
• For the production of fissionable materials, a breakthrough came when it was discovered that a new process, thermal diffusion, could provide slightly enriched uranium, which would then feed the gaseous diffusion and electromagnetic processes for further enrichment.
The parallel processes were unexpectedly combined into a composite process that finally achieved the desired performance. • For bomb design, a second group of scientists had worked on an implosion design as a back up. xi When it became clear in the spring of 1944 that the gun approach did not work for plutonium, the implosion design became first priority. Still, unprecedented challenges had to be overcome because the implosion had to be perfectly symmetrical in order to achieve a chain reaction. This demanded mastery of a new uncharted field: hydrodynamics of implosions.
The implosion design using plutonium was frozen in February 1945 and tested in the famous Trinity test, on July 16, 1945. On August 6 and August 9, 1945, the two first nuclear bombs exploded with terrifying impact over Nagasaki and Hiroshima.
In summary, the Manhattan Project exemplified a willingness to pursue multiple approaches in parallel, although one of them working would have sufficed to achieve the This way of managing a project seemingly flies in the face of professional project management principles as they are taught today. But the result was a technical performance that had been thought impossible in 1940 (except by a few theoretical physicists), achieved in less than three years, albeit at the cost of a large budget overrun---the budget was the lowest priority. In summary, the operational definitions, priorities, actions, and even "efficiency" itself were repeatedly changed and subordinated to the Navy's strategic organizational goal: securing resources in competition with the Air Force.
Atlas and Polaris: the First Ballistic Missiles Projects

Project Management Theory in the 1950s
Consistent with the Manhattan and missile projects, and with several other well-known projects of the period, xx decision theory in the 1950s advocated parallel trials and experimentation in certain situations. For example, Alchian and Kessel (1954) The advantage of a parallel strategy is not only the time but also the information gained from the trials, even if they are ultimately abandoned. The result may be a better end result and, in addition, a lower cost (which many managers find counter-intuitive) stemming from the better design ultimately chosen.
R&D projects often suffer from considerable uncertainty with respect to which of several alternatives was best.
When the designs are novel, the underlying scientific knowledge poor, and the decision maker too pressed for time to postpone a decision until more scientific work has been done, the parallel pursuit of several alternatives, although seemingly expensive, is probably cheaper than to end up with an inappropriate system that has to be coaxed into working appropriately.
In addition to parallel trials, the theorists in the 1950s also recognized the need for trialand-error approaches, changing the project plan mid course. For example, Arrow (1955) made the connection between parallel trials and sequential modifications by arguing that it was unproductive to shoot for an "optimal" design at the outset, xxiii because this optimal design was not known. At best, several alternative scenarios were known, hence optimizing for one was likely to be wrong when the uncertainty had settled. Therefore, a "generalist" approach was appropriate at the outset which could be modified over time, In summary, by the end of the 1950s, spectacular examples of PM success existed that had used parallel trials and flexible trial-and-error approaches. Moreover, a scientific decisionmaking theory had been developed that could explain why and when these approaches should be used, as opposed to a planned "get it right the first time" approach. However, none of this survived in the professional "bibles" of today; the phased stage-gate approach has been internalized so thoroughly by the profession that any mention of "parallel trials" today is met by incredulous reactions of the "this is unprofessional" type. We now turn to the story of how this happened.
or multiple alternative approaches started which could be narrowed down as information became available.
From Performance to Control
The view of major projects began to change in the early 1960s. The deployment of the Atlas, Titan and Polaris ballistic missiles diminished the fear of the "missile gap" with the USSR.
Thereafter, the "national security" projects' sense of utmost urgency faded away.
This which introduced a broad audience to a view of defense as an economic problem of resource allocation to achieve a desired objective. This had major consequences for project management: the focus gradually changed from the "performance at all costs" attitude of the first missiles projects to one of optimizing the cost/performance ratio. 3. The first two changes fundamentally affected the way defense projects were managed.
They emphasized the complete definition of the system before its development in order to limit uncertainty; lower uncertainty eliminated the need for parallel trials and experimentation. Furthermore, a strict insistence on a phased approach, ending each phase with a review before the next phase could be started, suppressed concurrency with its associated risks of having to "un-do" work because the preceding (but concurrently executed) stage had to make a change. MacNamara considered concurrency to be uncontrollable and risky, since, with immature technology, design changes might spread throughout the program, causing cost overruns and delays. 
Institutionalization of the Phased Approach
If the 1960s defined the form that project management would take in practice, the discipline was still in its infancy -it lacked a recognizable academic status as a field, and it also lacked professional recognition; project manager was still a new role.
On the theoretical and academic side, the MacNamara revolution at the DoD had a counterpart in the early literature on project management (just as the parallel approach of the 1940s and 1950s had had but with a much wider impact on project management practice).
Notably, Systems Analysis and Project Management by Cleland and King became a classic, xxx
By the early 1970s, the phased approach had already become "natural" and was transferred to the product development field; Since all its founders were project control experts, it was natural for the PMI to focus on control tools, such as PERT/ CPM. Indeed, it was first envisioned as a "National CPM Society" before the scope was enlarged to project management in general. "Modern project management" became equated with PERT/CPM after Polaris and the MacNamara revolution, and this remained true for the next two decades. The creation of the PMI was the last step in a process that started in the early 1960s with
McNamara and progressively led to the dominant definition of a control-oriented model of project management. In the early 1970s, all elements were in place:
• Phased planning defined the mission (reducing uncertainty) and governed the project evolution; project management tools like PERT/CPM helped to control it.
• NASA and the DoD contributed to making this approach a de facto standard by incorporating this model in their bidding process.
• Exemplary cases, such as Polaris and Apollo, served as showcases, demonstrating the power of this approach to manage large-scale and complex R&D projects.
xxxix
• A professional association, the PMI, widely publicized the phased approach. Using it as the keystone of its certification process, the PMI reinforced it as a standard in the US (and the international) PM communities.
As a result, parallel strategies, experimentation and concurrency disappeared from professional PM for 20 years. Even P. Morris, in his brilliant history of project management, seemed to forget the lessons from the 1950s when he described the projects of the late 1960s: "Several
major projects were experiencing traumatic difficulties (Concorde, SST, TAPS…). (…) With regard to the development of project management as a discipline, curiously, many of the difficulties that these projects were experiencing were due to issues that PM had not yet addressed formally -notably technical uncertainty and contract strategy." xl
Criticism and Reinvention
Thus the practical and theoretical knowledge from the projects and writing of the 1950s about how to systematically deal with high uncertainty was lost.
The Limits of the Phased Approach: an Example
To illustrate the limitations of a stage-gate process in a novel project, consider the construction of a first-of-its-kind facility for the conversion of iron ore into pure iron in Trinidad in 2000. After an initial risk analysis, the project was organized into the usual phases of planning, construction, ramp-up and operation. However, the facility represented a scale-up of a factor of 5,000 over the lab concept studies that had established the chemical reduction process.
Essentially "the basics of the reaction kinetics were not understood", as the head of R&D commented. But this was not reflected in the project plan; the project manager found himself iteratively working through the process steps (pre-heater, hydrogen atmosphere insertion, first reduction reactor, second reactor, etc) to fix their working configurations, adding modifications that had not been foreseen in the original design nor in the risk management contingencies.
Over 18 months, the project manager had to go to the board six times to report facility shutdowns and major changes, rather than the hoped-for ramp-up.
In the end, the project manager was demoted and a new team brought in. This team conducted a comprehensive "progress review", identified 130 "quality problems", and fixed these over another 12 months with a strict phased planning approach. After this period, rampup was successful and the facility reached its design capacity. The company concluded that the second team had won the day with better, more disciplined, methods. However, this analysis failed to recognize that the first project manager had made the fundamental design modifications that reduced the uncertainty level and enabled operation at the scale required; the subsequent "rigorous planning" phase succeeded only because this fundamental work had been carried out first. The project was a technical success in the end, but with a schedule delay of two years, and came at the expense of the careers of the first project team.
Generalizing the lessons from this example, the phased approach implicitly rests on two key assumptions, both explicitly desired by the MacNamara revolution: first, the project goals and targets are clear and given from above, and second, the means of reaching the targets are identifiable and plannable (possibly with refinements as the phases progress). But these assumptions are simply not fulfilled in ambitious novel projects or in major strategic initiatives, as we summarize in Table 1 . The assumption in the Circored example was that the technology was known except for identified risks; this underestimation of the technical challenge was sufficient to throw the project into turmoil. But long-term strategic initiatives, projects with external effects (and thus conflicting stakeholder views), and projects on novel domains (market or technology) often do not have defined goals xliii and need to shape emergent approaches over time. xliv The phased approach does not support emergent approaches and emergent goals-although it might do so in principle if re-conceptualized (a re-definition of phases becomes in fact an emergent approach), the usually implemented phased approach with its above described history does not.
Criticism and the Rediscovery of Iteration and Parallel Trials
The McNamara revolution had its critics right from the start. Up-front system definition and strict monitoring in the phased approach led to the creation of a complex system of committees, which some in the DoD viewed as "creeping centralization". They saw the phased approach as reducing innovation and increasing development times.
xlv Even some of the apostles of the phased approach warned against its negative effects.
Charles Hitch himself, one of McNamara's key officers, identified "common pitfalls" of R&D management in his 1960 book mentioned before: (1) too little duplication, (2) too little competition, (3) premature, optimistic, and over-detailed advanced system requirements, (4) excessive centralization of decision-making, (5) premature commitment of large funds, and (6) too little emphasis on the early stage of R&D. The first four of these six problems were, ironically, outcomes of the MacNamara revolution that Hitch helped to shape.
Concurrency was the first of the 1950s concepts to be rediscovered in the innovation domain, where the problem of high uncertainty could not be ignored. The notion of concurrency was re-imported from Japan via two landmark articles A phased approach with overlapping is not a sufficient answer for the novel projects from Table 1. xlix Recent theory building supports this criticism: l uncertainty causes the project workload to be initially underestimated, while the effective project team size is overestimated because it takes more time than expected to assemble a productive team. The combination of this with tight budgets and schedules in the stage-gate process' feasibility phase sets off a feedback dynamic. Underestimated workload and an understaffed team create schedule pressure; budget constraints limit the possibility to add resources for problem solving, which aggravates schedule pressure, prompts turnover in an already understaffed team, and results in the team missing schedules. This may eventually lead management to conclude that the project is unviable. The strict logic of "time and investment stages each leading to demonstrated progress" must be loosened to allow for iteration and duplication in order to handle unforeseeable events.
Parallel trials and iterative experimentation were also rediscovered in the innovation domain, but took longer -well into the 1990s. Experimentation was revived by innovation researchers, who referred to it using terms such as "product morphing", "probe-and-learn" or "agility".
li Flexibility includes the possibility of postponing the design freeze, allowing specifications to evolve (within the limits of a modular base) until market uncertainty has been resolved.
lii Parallel trials were observed in software development, in Toyota's "set-based engineering", or "product churning" among Japanese consumer electronics companies.
liii Although observed during the 1990s, iteration and parallel trials were not recognized as fundamental approaches to high project uncertainty until ten years later, when search theory explained why they were required to explore "unknown terrains". When multiple performance parameters interact, the theory showed that multiple trials simultaneously offer the best hope for finding a satisfactory solution. 
How to Increase PM Relevance by Leveraging the Roots
How the Exclusive Focus on the Phased Approach Limits PM
With their focus on the phased stage-gate approach, the PMI and even the DoD as a key driver and major customer, have gotten what they asked for. The DoD's preferred approach to systems development is based on a time-phased plan to develop a new system in increments with shorter acquisition cycle times. lv This approach promises greater cost and schedule control but assumes that uncertainty can be limited at the outset and requires technical maturity.
lvi But this seems illusory. Today's defense projects continue to require leading-edge solutions, which often fall into the right-hand column of Table 1 because of technology uncertainty as well as emergent stakeholder issues. It is no wonder that many defense projects experience significant difficulties, many because of an underestimation of uncertainty.
lvii It is true that the 1940s tools of parallelism and iteration are still used, as illustrated by the following example. A start-up company introduced a new metal surface-finishing process with a potential to reduce friction between moving parts by up to 30%.
lviii Of course, uncertainty should be limited wherever possible by using proven components, but defense projects with ambitious performance goals intrinsically necessitate going beyond proven solutions. By the original design of the phased approach ("orders come from the DoD, and uncertainty is eliminated by analysis at the outset"), uncertainty stemming from novelty has been declared non-existent. The phased approach is applied as a catch-all, but as a result its cost and schedule advantages have proved illusory.
The start-up used parallel trials -it needed only one market but pursued several in parallel (medical, auto, hydraulics).
The company also used experimentation and iteration; as of 2007 they discovered that the underlying mechanism worked differently than they had thought, and thus changed the primary application to solar power plants, where surface treatment of the pipe that transported the heated fluid to the turbine reduced energy losses (due to radiation) by 20%. This application allowed the company to survive the 2008 economic crisis, and to break even at a low level.
But these actions happen outside the discipline of project management. When discussing such examples, professional project managers view them as either "special" (e.g., applying only to chaotic start-ups) or simply "sloppy" ("Why did they not perform better risk planning beforehand?"). Companies that do end up applying iteration and parallel trials feel uncomfortable doing so and feel it undermines their professionalism. Such companies apply parallel trials and experimentation despite their professional PM training, not because PM training has given them the tools to deal with push-the-envelope projects.
The two key assumptions underlying the phased approach, traceable to the original Table 1 ), PM has confined itself in an "order taker niche" of carrying out tasks given from above, cutting itself off from two major areas of management that should be within the discipline's scope in line with the roots that the Manhattan Project laid down:
Strategy making and strategic search. Strategy is only partially regarded as a planned and deliberate choice of competitive position; to a larger degree it is seen as an emergent response to chaotic and unpredictable changes in a complex environment. Innovation. Highly innovative initiatives do not fit the linear phased approach; they require looping back (iteration) and parallelism, as well as finding ways to explain to stakeholders that the scope and deliverables of a project may change. The exclusive focus on the phased approach has handicapped the ability of many firms to pursue such innovative, push-theenvelope initiatives. Of course, many firms do not perform novel projects -and there is nothing wrong with that if it fits their strategy -but many firms do, and among them some believe that experimentation can be relegated to research (e.g., "When the new technology is proven and ready, we'll incorporate it into our market delivery initiatives"). Others think they can use a stage-gate "light" approach with less precisely defined phases. However, neither enables a company to respond to uncertainty, still less to take advantage of it, when unforeseen events arise from technology, competition, user and regulatory changes at the same time. Relegating innovation projects to research is like using "crutches" that make you limp. Just consider the dismal statistics of project failures, most of which are caused not by simple incompetence but by not being prepared for the surprises that are intrinsic to ambitious projects.
A PM discipline that looks not only for alignment (that is, clear specifications that are certain to support strategic goals) but for the ability to develop new strategic opportunities would be able to move closer to the core of managerial relevance.
lxv By focusing exclusively on the phased approach, the PM discipline has missed out on these two high-impact areas of management. This does damage at two levels: damage to the discipline by relegating it to an engineering-execution niche rather than occupying the influential center stage, and damage to companies because it denies them a powerful weapon in innovating and evolving strategy. Again, companies do apply trial-and-error and parallel approaches in their novel projects because they have no choice, but in doing so they go against their professional PM training rather than being supported by it.
How to Broaden PM Again
Capturing the two missed opportunities for PM described in Section 6.1 requires revisiting the concept of the discipline of PM, going back to the roots of the 1950s as well as integrating new tools that have subsequently emerged in adjacent fields. Specifically, capturing the two opportunities requires: (1) allowing projects to not only execute existing plans and targets but to create novel solutions that modify and improve those plans, and (2) developing a more flexible alternative to the staged product life cycle for novel and innovative projects.
Projects as Strategy Making Tools
Projects do not only execute strategy ("Senior management decides, the project manager carries out tasks") but can be used to make strategy. Consider the following example of a plant manager who saw the age statistics of his plant (typical of the demographics in any Western country) and raised the question: "We as a workforce are getting older. Do we have any idea how we are going to maintain productivity?" No one had an answer until two production line managers proposed running a pilot experimental production line with the worker mix forecasted for 2017.
Still, no one knew what to do or how best to adapt the line to older employees. They then empowered frontline people in the pilot line, who developed (with help from specialists) close to 100 implementable solutions via process changes. After a year, the line achieved the same productivity and quality as lines with younger workers. Frontline staff had solved the problem initially raised by the unit head.
lxvi A recent study showed that in six high-performance manufacturing organizations, on average 50% of strategic improvement projects were generated bottom-up by ideas from operational and frontline employees. These projects addressed not only processes and methods but also the product/market positioning.
The project had started with a question, and multiple parties had contributed to create a solution that became part of the corporate production system. This project was not about executing strategy; it was about creating a new strategic solution to a problem that the organization faced.
In this way, projects are vehicles for organizational (strategic) learning. The project challenge lies in between what is wanted and is feasible, but is also an essential source of insight about the strategic challenges of the organization and their solutions -indeed it is a central component of organizational learning.
lxix If the project management discipline is to contribute to the strategic use of improvement projects as outlined above, it must develop expertise and methods for including projects in the strategy process of the organization. Strategy processes connect the business strategy to the operational action plans; they run both ways, top-down and bottom-up. This requires broadening the traditional concepts of a project "mission" and a "specification" from given targets to open problems for which the project proposes solutions.
An Expanded Process for Novel and Innovative Projects
Larger, complex projects with the ambition to contribute to strategy must intrinsically accept a higher level of risk and events that are unforeseeable at the outset (see Table 1 ) -precisely as in the technologically novel situation that the Manhattan Project faced. Such projects are "experimental learning processes" or "arenas for learning": 1. In novel projects, targets are not given but come from a broad desired (strategic) direction and a vision, but details are initially hypotheses and may evolve. Thus, an influence on targets needs to be integrated in PM.
Of course, no project ever consists exclusively of push-the-envelope activities with high uncertainty; every project has parts that are relatively routine. The project management discipline can contribute to the organization's ability to carry out novel projects by developing processes that allow targeted flexibility in the following ways:
2. Diagnose the uncertainty profile of the project. In particular, identify project modules that are subject to looming unforeseeable events. Although the events themselves may be unforeseeable, the areas of the project that are affected by knowledge gaps are often identifiable. lxxiv 3. Manage routine project modules with a standard phased approach.
4. Manage highly uncertain project pieces by identifying questions that must be answered in order to reduce uncertainty, then apply a combination of parallel trials and iteration: design parallel prototypes or iterative cycles of activities that aim to answer those questions. In other words, the Gantt Chart contains not only activities that produce "progress" toward the end goal, but also activities that answer questions about knowledge gaps or assumptions, with answers that may well force a modification of the initially identified project goal.
5. Put a governance structure in place that empowers the project manager to reassess the situation repeatedly depending on the emerging status.
Such flexible methods are currently emerging but do already exist as templates; one template is shown in Figure 3 .
lxxv
The self-restriction of the PM discipline was never consciously imposed by any decision body; it arose from the series of historical "accidents" described in this paper. However, the discipline should overcome its self-imposed constraints and go back to its roots of "making the impossible happen" from the 1940s. PM has a critical role to play in organizational challenges, particularly in the aftermath of the economic crisis of 2008. First prototypes of tools are already available that could allow PM to contribute to strategy formulation and start improving its record on push-the-envelope initiatives. What is needed now is the will of the community to pick up the challenge.
Developing such templates into robust and professionally taught standards would help to bring the project management discipline out of its self-imposed "order taker niche" into the mainstream of managing strategic initiatives. The development of nuclear submarines in the 1950s constitutes another illustration of the use of the parallel approach in innovative military projects. There were two competing technologies (sodiumcooled and water-cooled reactors) proposed by different contractors. Since nobody was able to foresee which would work best, two different reactors were built and tested in submarines, and the best chosen ex-post (the Navy opted for water-cooled reactors in 1958). See Hewlett R, Duncan F. 1974 . Nuclear Navy, 1946 -1962 . University of Chicago Press: Chicago.
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